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Judicial Opinion as Historical Account:
Parents Involved and the Modern Legacy
of Brown v. Board of Education
Scarlet Kim*
The story of school desegregation in America is so pivotal to our
understanding of the Civil Rights Movement that divergent interpretations
become more than scholarly endeavors; they rattle our faith in social
change. The story about desegregation traditionally begins with Brown v.
Board ofEducation.' When Michael Klarman first suggested in 1994 that
Brown may have contributed less to the Civil Rights Movement than
conventionally believed,2 legal historians pilloried his scholarship.3
*J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, Class of 2011.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7, 13 & n. 14 (1994) (stating that "[t]here exists a widespread tendency to
treat Brown as the inaugural event of the modem civil rights movement" and citing relevant
examples).
2. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, supra note 1.
3. See David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of
Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 151, 153 (1994) ("Professor Klarman needlessly offers the hypothetical
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Brown had attained a position "so politically sacrosanct" that any
recalibration of its import or influence threatened to fundamentally
undermine the accepted history of the Civil Rights Movement itself.'
Although Klarman's theory is no longer as controversial as it once was,5
debates over the legacy of Brown continue to raise fundamental questions
about social change in America that transcend the bounds of academic
dispute.6
Much of the reinterpretation of Brown's significance naturally focuses
on the history of the Supreme Court, particularly on its role in effecting
contention that 'a transformation in American race relations was . .. a virtual inevitability' by 1950, a
highly optimistic assertion that leads him to claim that Brown was 'unnecessary from the perspective
of long-term racial change.' He continues with the even more dubious argument that 'regardless of
Brown, the underlying forces for racial change,' such as international events and the increasing
emergence of a black middle class, 'would have led to congressional legislation to squelch' the most
visible manifestations of southern segregation."); Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board
of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173, 184 (1994) ("One might be as pessimistic as Professor Klarman is
in his characterization of Brown, and as optimistic as he is in his determinist account of the
transformation of race relations, without thinking that his pessimism is properly attached to Brown
when characterized as a Supreme Court decision. To the extent that Professor Klarman appears to
believe that he has established the unimportance of Brown in that sense, and to believe that he has
deepened our understanding of the limits of judicial power, he is mistaken."). Several years prior to
the publication of Klarman's argument on the subject, Gerald Rosenberg advanced a more extreme
view, categorically dismissing the importance of Brown in catalyzing the successes of the Civil Rights
Movement. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991). Rosenberg's discussion of Brown, however, was embedded within a larger
argument about judicial efficacy and social change. Perhaps legal historians found Klarman's thesis
more threatening because it did suggest a connection between Brown and the Civil Rights Movement,
just not the relationship traditionally depicted in academic literature. See Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow
History, supra, at 151-52 & n.7 ("Gerald N. Rosenberg's wholly unpersuasive contention that
Professor Klarman . . . 'overstates Brown's influence' because the decision was 'merely a ripple' with
only 'a negligible effect' on intensifying southern segregationist sentiment is so thoroughly rebutted
and disproved by a credible and copious scholarly literature that no further rejoinder is required.").
4. Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Correctness, 80 VA. L.
REV. 185, 185 (1994) (observing that "it is today unacceptable not only to question the constitutional
basis of Brown but also to ponder the decision's significance for the civil rights revolution of the
1960s"); see, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 174 ("Professor Klarman's account has the peculiar and
no doubt unintended effect of substantially reducing the apparent role of African Americans [in the
Civil Rights Movement], coming close to eliminating African Americans as historical agents, as
acting subjects in the historical process rather than its objects.").
5. See Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 973, 974 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)) (noting the irony that "on the
fiftieth anniversary ofBrown many scholars and some civil rights activists regard the decision as a
failure," and citing as examples Charles Ogletree and Derrick Bell); David J. Garrow, "Happy"
Birthday, Brown v. Board of Education? Brown's Fiftieth Anniversary and the New Critics of
Supreme Court Muscularity, 90 VA. L. REV. 693, 722, 724 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
(2004)) (observing that Klarman's book, which elaborates on his earlier arguments regarding Brown's
significance, "parallels a dismaying but undeniably flourishing trend in American constitutional
criticism").
6. Garrow, "Happy" Birthday, supra note 4, at 728-29 (arguing a decade after the original
presentation of Klarman's thesis that Klarman's "interpretation of Brown will not be embraced by
celebrants of Brown's fiftieth anniversary" and that "more is at stake here than simply Brown's
historical stature and reputation").
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social change.' One interesting question that arises from these inquiries is
how the Court itself understands the legacy of Brown. Of course, the
Court has articulated its interpretation of Brown as legal judgment and
judicial precedent time and time again.8 But to what extent has the Court
expressed an understanding of Brown as historical event? Has the Court
recognized Brown as embedded within a larger history of race relations in
America? And if so, how has this recognition influenced the Court's
evaluation of its own role in this history?
This paper will consider these questions by analyzing the judicial
opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1.9 The case, which considers whether local school districts
may voluntarily adopt race-conscious student assignment plans in pursuit
of racially integrated schools, may be read as "the final chapter of the
constitutional and cultural legacy of Brown in public education." 10
7. See Jack M. Balkin, Preface to WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID:
THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION xi
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) ("Brown has become a symbol of the role of courts in a democracy. It has
been at the center of a continuing debate over the role of law in reshaping society, the extent to which
courts can successfully push for lasting social change, and the legitimacy in their trying to do so.");
ROSENBERG, supra note 2 (arguing that the Supreme Court is ineffective at catalyzing widespread
social change and utilizing Brown and its aftermath as an example); Garrow, "Happy" Birthday,
supra note 4, at 728-29 (observing that Klarman's book, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, aims "to convince us that no decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court can ever 'fundamentally transform a nation'); see also Garrow, "Happy"
Birthday, supra note 4, at 722-23 (noting that "[e]xtreme conservatives were ecstatic" by the
publication of Rosenberg's book for its attempt "to disparage the widespread belief that the greatest
lesson of modem American legal history is that the Supreme Court can, and often has, almost single-
handedly brought about transformative change in American life in decisions ranging from Brown to
Baker v. Carr to Roe v. Wade").
8. The Supreme Court's interpretation of Brown's legal holding has also evolved over time. The
Court initially interpreted the holding of Brown quite narrowly. In 1958, the Court held in Cooper v.
Aaron, 351 U.S. 1 (1958), that Brown stood for the proposition "that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids States to use their governmental powers to bar children on racial grounds from attending
schools where there is state participation through any arrangement, management, funds or property."
Id. at 2. However, "[w]ithin a decade ... the meaning of Brown began to change and expand, both
within the larger political culture and in the opinions of the Supreme Court itself." Jack M. Balkin,
Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 6, at 3, 9.
In a series of subsequent decisions, the Court affirmed lower court orders requiring the desegregation
of a variety of public facilities. Id. at 9 & n.24 (citing to New Orleans Park Improvement Ass'n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public parks), aff'g 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam) (public transportation), af'g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.);
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public bath houses and beaches), aff'g 220 F.2d
386 (4th Cir.)). In 1963, the Court cited Brown for the proposition "that a State may not
constitutionally require segregation of public facilities." Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963)
(per curiam) (holding that "[s]tate-compelled segregation in a court of justice is a manifest violation
of the State's duty to deny no one the equal protection of its laws"). A year later, Justice Arthur
Goldberg declared that Brown "affirmed the right of all Americans to public equality." Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 287-88 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (considering whether state
enforcement of racial discrimination by a private restaurant violated the Equal Protection Clause, but
remanding in recognition of a supervening change in state law).
9. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
10. Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 277 (2007); Robert L. Hayman,
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Parents Involved represents the "third generation" in a typology of school
desegregation cases." In "first generation" cases such as Brown, the
Court ruled that racially segregated schools were inherently unequal and
ordered their desegregation. In "second generation" cases, consisting
primarily of a trio of cases in the early 1990s, the Court found that schools
could abandon desegregation efforts once they had demonstrated a "good
faith" effort at compliance.12 The "third generation" of cases feature
school districts such as Seattle and Louisville that have voluntarily
committed to continuing desegregation efforts, without the mandate of a
desegregation decree.' 3
Parents Involved arose "in the modern context of demographic trends
that portend an increasingly diverse but segregated society."14
Confronted with this stark reality, the Seattle and Louisville school
districts voluntarily adopted race-conscious student assignment plans with
the purpose of preventing de facto segregation. These plans sought to
ensure that the student population in each school reflected the racial
demographics of their respective school district.'" By striking down these
Jr. & Leland Ware, The Geography of Discrimination: The Seattle and Louisville Cases and the
Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, in CHOOSING EQUALITY: ESSAYS AND NARRATIVES ON THE
DESEGREGATION EXPERIENCE 313 (Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Leland Ware eds., 2009) (warning that
"[l]eft unchallenged, [Parents Involved] threatens to be the final word on desegregation").
11. Hayman & Ware, The Geography ofDiscrimination, supra note 9, at 312.
12. Id. (referring to Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. (1995) (overturning a Kansas City plan to
attract white students to inner city schools to remedy defacto segregation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467 (1992) (finding that courts could dissolve certain aspects of school desegregation orders even if
school districts had never complied with other aspects); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237 (1991) (holding that courts could dissolve desegregation orders in school districts that
had attempted to comply in good faith)).
13. Id.
14. Liu, Seattle and Louisville, supra note 9, at 277 (observing that "[t]he average white student
attends a school that is nearly 80% white;" "[t]he average black student attends a school that is over
half black;" and "[i]n the entirety of our history, never has a majority of the nation's black
schoolchildren attended majority-white schools" (citing figures from GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI
LEE, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 8 tbl.1, 13 fig.1
(2006) and ERICA FRANKENBURG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS:
ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 38 fig. 10 (South), 39 fig. 11 (2003)). See also GARY ORFIELD, SUSAN
E. EATON & THE HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996) (examining resegregation trends
and including case studies of desegregation efforts in several cities); Sean F. Reardon et al., The
Changing Structure of School Segregation: Measurement and Evidence of Multiracial Metropolitan-
Area School Segregation, 1989-1995, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 351, 358 & tbl.3 (2000) (measuring indices
of racial segregation in 217 metropolitan areas and finding that 80% of racial segregation was
"between whites and members of other groups").
15. Seattle operates ten public high schools for a multiracial community, whose public school
enrollment is approximately 41% white and 59% nonwhite. The student assignment plan, adopted in
1998, allowed incoming ninth-graders to rank their choice of schools. If a school was oversubscribed,
the district "employled] a series of 'tiebreakers' to determine who w[ould] fill the open slots." The
first tiebreaker favored students with a sibling enrolled in the school and the second tiebreaker relied
on "the racial composition of the particular school and the race of the individual student." If the
oversubscribed school was "not within 10 percentage points of the district's overall white/nonwhite
racial balance," the district "select[ed] for assignment students whose race [would] serve to bring the
162 [Vol. 23:159
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plans, a plurality of the Court asserted an end to the story of Brown, to the
constitutionally cognizable problem of racial segregation in public
schools. The legal resolution of de jure segregation had drawn to a
close;' 6 de facto segregation did not present an issue as a matter of law.
As Chief Justice Roberts put it:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could
not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts
in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating
that we should allow this once again - even for very diferent
reasons.17
Yet, the fractured nature of the judgment in Parents Involved challenges
this conclusive reading of Brown. Resting on a fragile plurality and
heavily contested by impassioned dissent, Parents Involved reveals a
Court deeply divided over the meaning of Brown. In a collection of five
separate opinions, the Justices use Brown in different ways both to weave
an historical account and to arrive at legal judgment. Among legal
historians, as among the Justices, these interpretive differences reveal a
heated debate over the history of race relations in America and the
Court's role in shaping this history.
The first part of the paper will engage in a theoretical comparison of
judge and historian. The first section of this part will consider significant
areas of overlap. The earliest associations between judge and historian
focused primarily on the mutual importance of storytelling or narrative.
As historians gradually developed a methodology of evidence and proof,
the comparison between judge and historian shifted to the use and
school into balance." The racial tiebreaker served "to address the effects of racially identifiable
housing patterns on school assignments." Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711-12 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Louisville initiated a voluntary student assignment plan in 2001, following
the dissolution of a desegregation order by the District Court in 2000. In a school district where
approximately 66% of the students are white and 34% are black, the plan "require[d] all nonmagnet
schools to maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent, and a maximum black enrollment of
50 percent." The plan assigned students, living in designated geographic areas, to a cluster of
elementary schools. Kindergartners, first-graders, and new students could "submit an application
indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster." The school district then
assigned "students to schools within their cluster ... based on available space within the schools and
the racial guidelines in the District's current student assignment plan." When "a school ha[d] reached
the extremes of the racial guidelines, a student whose race would contribute to the school's racial
imbalance [would] not be assigned there." Id. at 715-17 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
16. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra
note 6, at 7 (observing that "[t]he Supreme Court's decisions have accelerated the federal courts'
drive to end existing desegregation orders" and that school districts that remain "technically subject to
court orders . .. now face virtually no enforcement activity"); Wendy Parker, The Future of School
Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1157 ("Today, we commonly define the future of court-
ordered school desegregation as a non-issue: either desegregation cases are dead or, at the very least,
the death knell has sounded.").
17. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747 (emphasis added).
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evaluation of sources to buttress legal argument or historical account.
The second section of this part highlights a significant tension between
judge and historian. This tension hinges on the different purposes each
role serves. While the judge must dispense justice, the historian
endeavors to provide an accurate or truthful account of matters past.
These divergent goals may inherently structure the use of evidence by
judge and historian, contributing to differences in methodological means.
Given that judges must deliver legal judgment, not historical account,
how do we assess historical accounts embedded in legal judgment?
Focusing on the Supreme Court as an institution of public authority, this
paper suggests that the Court has the power, through judicial opinion, to
institutionalize particular historical accounts that influence the collective
memory of the nation. This section draws on the work of Pamela
Brandwein to suggest that this institutionalization of history is the product
of an interpretive competition, whereby the Court produces multiple
"historical truths."" Parents Involved provides a useful lens for
examining this contest, as its judicial opinions embody several competing
interpretations of the significance of Brown in American history.
The second part of the paper will analyze the judicial use of history by
the Supreme Court in Parents Involved. The first section of this part will
explore the judicial use of history as evidence in Chief Justice Roberts's
plurality opinion, Justice Thomas's concurrence, and Justice Breyer's
dissent. Framing Brown as akin to constitutional text, this section will
illustrate how these Justices applied historical methods traditionally
reserved for interpreting the Constitution to Brown itself. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas applied the methodology of intent theory,
examining the history behind the Brown decision to defend the plurality's
interpretation of the meaning of Brown. Justice Breyer applied the
methodology of ongoing history, analyzing the history since Brown to
buttress the dissent's interpretation of Brown's legacy.
The second section of this part will explore Justice Kennedy's use of
history as narrative in his concurrence. This part will posit that Justice
Kennedy's opinion structures Parents Involved as a constitutional
narrative about schools or the meaning of civic education, rather than
about race. Reading Justice Kennedy's opinion as a narrative about
schools helps explain his lack of engagement with the history of Brown
relative to the other Justices. Moreover, by shifting the narrative from
race to schools, Justice Kennedy's opinion draws attention to the way in
which narrative can affect the judicial use of history as evidence. Justice
Kennedy looks not to the history of racial progress in this country since
18. PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999).
[Vol. 23:159164
6
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/3
Kim
Brown; rather, he considers the modem historical record on civic
education in American schools.
This paper does not purport to elevate one judicial interpretation of
history over another. It endeavors to identify the different judicial uses of
history employed by the Supreme Court and examine how those uses
structure legal judgment. This exercise is not, however, devoid of
normative value. By revealing how both the contemporary legal
interpretation of Brown and the history of race relations in America are
subject to multiple readings, this paper urges critical evaluation, rather
than passive acceptance, of the Court's rendering of history.
I. COMPARING JUDGE AND HISTORIAN
A. Judge as Historian
The association between judge and historian bears an ancient history.
Carlo Ginzburg has argued that the relationship stretches back to the birth
of history itself, to "the beginnings in ancient Greece of the literary genre
we call 'history.""' The "argumentative ability [history] implied,"
Ginzburg observed, "was related to the judicial sphere."2 0 In the classical
tradition, the point of convergence between judge and historian was
precisely this "argumentative ability"; both judge and historian presented
convincing arguments by "convey[ing] a vivid representation of
characters and situations."21 The modem salience of narrative as an
aspect of legal argumentation may be a testament to this early historical
tradition.2 2
The comparison between judge and historian persisted as history
evolved to entail the collection and examination of evidence. Ginzburg
reported that the concept of a historian as one who "carefully evaluates
proofs and witnesses" was alien until the late 18th century.2 3 But once
historical scholarship embraced proof as its touchstone, modem parallels
19. Carlo Ginzburg, Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY
79,79 (1991).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 80.
22. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073
(1989) ("Why is there such a rush to storytelling? Why has narrative become such an important and
recurring theme in legal scholarship these days?"); see also id. at 2073 n.1 (giving an overview of the
literature on legal storytelling).
23. Ginzburg, supra note 18, at 80-81 ("Collective proofs was, until the mid-eighteenth century,
an activity practiced by antiquarians and erudites, not by historians. When, in his Traitd des
diffirentes sortes de preuves qui servent h 9tablir la vdritd de l'histoire (1769), the erudite Jesuit
Henri Griffet compared the historian to a judge who carefully evaluated proofs and witnesses, he was
expressing a still-unaddressed intellectual need. Only a few years later Edward Gibbon published his
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the first work that effectively combined historical narrative
with an antiquarian approach." (internal citations omitted)).
1652011]
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between judge and historian naturally came to focus on their use of
evidence. Today, judicial decision and historical conclusion rely on more
than colorful narrative; whatever narrative they employ must be grounded
in persuasive evidence.
Modern American debates about the judge as historian, or the judicial
use of history, largely concentrate on this relationship between historical
evidence and legal judgment. 24  According to these debates, an appeal to
authority drives judicial use of history. Historians scrutinize primary and
secondary sources - weighing them against each other, weaving bits and
pieces of them together - to provide the most credible account of our past.
Judges similarly invoke historical evidence as one basis of legal authority
grounding their resolution of legal issues.25 What ultimately makes
history so powerful, both as rhetoric and evidence, is its ability to proffer
an authoritative explanation of what has past.
Historical evidence is a compelling basis for legal authority because the
relationship between past and present is particularly critical in the legal
context. This linkage has deep roots in the English common law tradition.
In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, the prevailing concept of
an ancient constitution and law immemorial transformed judges such as
Lord Coke into historians, whose "historical thought could be described
as founded on the presumption that any legal judgment declaring a right
immemorial is perfectly valid as a statement of history." 26  Across the
Atlantic, Richard Posner has noted that "the law is in thrall to history."27
24. See, e.g., Matthew Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 SETON
HALL L. REV. 479, 482-83 (2008) ("Within the legal profession, debates have taken place over
whether using historical evidence in the resolution of legal questions is a proper normative
methodology, or is even a legitimate enterprise. And, in an extended dialogue with historians, legal
scholars and practitioners have also grappled with practical and methodological questions concerning
the application of historical evidence to law."). For a general sampling of this literature, see Daniel
A. Farber, Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections on History as Evidence, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1009
(1998) (considering the intersection between law and history in light of postmodernist attacks on the
objectivity and truth of evidence and proof); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and
Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2000); John
Philip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1993) (assessing critically the
interdisciplinary study of law and history). For literature focusing on the use of history by the
Supreme Court, see CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969);
Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965) (criticizing
the Warren Court's use of history to serve political ends); Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A
Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Use of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809 (1997) (applying Kelly's
critiques of the Warren Court's use of history to the Rehnquist Court).
25. Festa, supra note 23, at 487.
26. J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 38 (1987).
27. Posner, supra note 23, at 583. Posner takes issue with the assumption that "law's obeisance
to the past at the expense of the present and the future" can be "attributed to a mystical, perhaps quasi-
religious, veneration of ancient ways." Id. at 585. He outlines two alternative reasons for the judicial
use of history - rhetorical and informational. In the former, the judicial use of history "is not a sign of
thralldom to history but of the opposite, of bending history to the service of life." Id. at 580. In the
latter, Posner suggests that judges may simply find the use of history to be "their most efficient
166 [Vol. 23:159
8
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/3
2011]
Whether it be illuminating the meaning of constitutions and statutes,
considering judicial precedent, or piecing together a fact pattern, law and
history are inextricably intertwined.2 8
B. Judge Versus Historian
An account, no matter how condensed, of the comparison between
judge and historian cannot dispense without a summary of the key
divergences between the two. Perhaps the sharpest distinction between
judge and historian lies in the "different ideals that regulate their tasks."29
While "the judge must render a just sentence: the historian must provide a
truthful account."3" Thus, when judges and historians "invoke the notions
of evidence and proof," their "respective regulative ideals of justice and
truth decisively contribute to the understanding of what is to count as a
piece of evidence, what is to count as proof."" Legal evidence and
historical evidence may overlap but are conceptually distinct in that the
"former is in the service of establishing a just verdict, while the latter is
relevant for securing a truthful account of events."32
In service of different ends, judges have utilized historical evidence in a
manner considered abusive to some historians. In 1965, the historian
Alfred Kelly observed that the use of historical evidence by the Supreme
Court led to false historical conclusions, whereby the Justices stated "as
categorical absolutes propositions that the historian would find to be
tentative, speculative, interesting, and worthy of further investigation and
inquiry, but not at all pedigreed historical truth."33 Kelly argued that,
given that the very "premises" that guide the preparation of historical
evidence diverge radically from those guiding a professional historian, the
Court cannot but fail to provide historical truth.34 He concluded that by
attempting to serve both legal justice and historical truth, the Court had
method of deciding cases and resolving issues of institutional design." Id. at 585.
28. See Festa, supra note 23, at 484.
29. Arnold I. Davidson, Carlo Ginzburg and the Renewal of Historiography, in QUESTIONS OF
EVIDENCE: PROOF, PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 304, 307 (James Chandler
et al. eds., 1994).
30. Id. The notion of a "truthful account" of history has come under attack. See, e.g., PETER
NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
PROFESSION (1988) (tracing the history of the idea of objectivity in America, including its modem
collapse); Farber, supra note 23, at 1024 (noting the influence of anthropologists such as Clifford
Geertz and philosophers such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida in deconstructing historical
objectivity). For a discussion of historical objectivity with reference to law, compare Farber, supra
note 23 (defending the concept of objectivity in both history and law) with Posner, supra note 23, at
594 (arguing that the "elusiveness of historical Truth ... the truth of causal and evaluative assertions
about history" makes it impossible for a judge to be "historically oriented").
31. Davidson, supra note 28, at 307.
32. Id.
33. Kelly, supra note 23, at 155.
34. Id. at 156.
Kim 167
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"attempted to sit on two stools at once and had fallen between them."35
Interestingly, Kelly, along with the historian C. Vann Woodward,
assisted Thurgood Marshall prepare historical interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment to buttress Marshall's arguments before the
Supreme Court in Brown. When Kelly criticized the Court, he was
largely pointing to what he believed was the Warren Court's use of
historical evidence to arrive at decisions consistent with particular
political preferences. 36 Perhaps in light of perceived Warren Court
excesses, Kelly later expressed concerns about his participation in crafting
history for the purposes of legal advocacy in Brown:
I am very much afraid .. . that I ceased to function as a historian and
instead took up the practice of law without a license. The problem
we faced was not the historian's discovery of the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth; the problem instead was the
formulation of an adequate gloss on the fateful events of 1866
sufficient to convince the Court that we had something of an
historical case. . . . It is not that we were engaged in formulating lies;
there was nothing as crude and na'ive as that. But we were using
facts, emphasizing facts, bearing down on facts, sliding off facts in a
way to do what Marshall said we had to do - 'get by those boys
down there.' 37
Kelly's account is particularly relevant with regard to evaluating the
judicial use of history in Parents Involved. As the second part of the
paper discusses, both Justice Roberts's and Justice Thomas's opinions
relied heavily on the arguments presented by the NAACP lawyers in
Brown. Kelly suggests that those arguments themselves were crafted with
more regard for judicial outcome than for "the historian's discovery of the
truth."
Given this divergence between the role of judge and historian, the
judicial use of history demands critical appraisal. Critical appraisal
endeavors to understand what exactly is at stake when judges engage in
35. Id. at 155.
36. However, he noted that the judicial use of history on the Supreme Court has been the subject
of commentary and critique since the early national period. Id. at 119-120 ("Critical commentary
upon the adequacy of the Justices' historical endeavors, from both within and without the Court, is
nothing new. Almost a hundred and fifty years ago, Spencer Roane of the Virginia Supreme Court
accused John Marshall of inaccurately interpreting the intent of the Constitutional Convention of 1787
with respect to the true locus of sovereignty in the new 'confederation.' . . . Justices McLean and
Curtis both attacked Taney's opinion in the Dred Scott case in part on the ground that he had written
bad history, and some of Abraham Lincoln's comments were to the same effect. Similar criticisms
have recurred repeatedly in the twentieth century.") (internal citations omitted). For an application of
Kelly's critique to the Rehnquist Court, see Richards, supra note 24.
37. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCTON AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 643 (2d ed. 2004).
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historical interpretation as part of their legal decision-making process. By
incorporating historical account into legal judgment, judges create an
authoritative interpretation of the past that doubles as official government
record. Judicial interpretation of history may integrate itself into the
findings of fact, legal argument, and ultimately the outcome of the case,
which is then enshrined in official public record.38 Judges subsequently
draw upon this record as binding precedent to guide their decision-making
in future cases.
The use of history by the Supreme Court is of particular significance
because it serves as an institution of public authority. Charles Miller
observed that this authority "is maintained through the general acceptance
of the Court's decisions and the reasons offered for those decisions.""
Through its decisions, the Court naturally engages in historical
interpretation, for "[t]he Constitution itself is a product of the nation's
past."4 0 As "the accepted interpreter of the Constitution," the Court has
become "a public interpreter of American political history." 41 When the
Court declares the meaning of that history, it may, for better or worse,
"shape our collective public memory about the meaning of the past."4 2
Pamela Brandwein has examined the production of "historical truth[]"
by the Supreme Court in the post-Civil War context.43 She observed that
"the process by which historical knowledge gains 'truth' status" involves
a competition among "official" and "alternative" versions of events, a
"rhetorical contest through which 'authoritative' accounts are created.""
Brandwein applied this thesis to the Court's interpretation of the
Reconstruction Amendments in the 1870s. She asserted that the Court
adopted an interpretation hewing closely to Northern Democratic views
on slavery, which considered formal emancipation as marking "the
38. Festa, supra note 23, at 506.
39. MILLER, supra note 23, at 25 ("By writing history into its opinions the Court contributes to
the public's view of the American past as much as, and sometimes even more than, professional
historians and other historical writers do. When the Supreme Court has the chance to tell us what
American history is, history becomes more than a tool of decision. It affirms or denies the
significance of past events for the activities of the present."). For a rather radical variant of this
statement, see William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses
of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 227, 227-28 (1998) (describing the Supreme Court as "the only
institution in human experience that has the power to declare history: that is, to articulate some
understanding of the past and then compel the rest of society to conform its behavior to that
understanding.... Even where the Court's history is at odds with the actual past, that judicial history,




43. BRANDWEIN, supra note 17. Brandwein did not focus exclusively on the Supreme Court, but
examined the "production and use of the dominant history of Reconstruction" by "a variety of social
institutions." Id. at 3.
44. Id. at 3.
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resolution of the slavery problem."45 Accordingly, Brandwein argued, the
Court interpreted the "one pervading purpose" of the Reconstruction
Amendments as "the freedom of the slave race [and] the security and firm
establishment of that freedom."46
Brandwein illustrated that the Court willfully ignored another
interpretation of slavery, and, therefore, the Reconstruction Amendments.
According to the Republicans, slavery's problem "included slavery's
destruction of white men's civil liberties, its stagnating commitments, and
the accretion of illegitimate political power to the aristocratic
slaveholding elite."47 The Republicans believed these problems were
alive and well throughout Reconstruction; the Reconstruction
Amendments should have guaranteed federal protection against Black
Codes, Ku Klux Klan violence, the reversion of economic control to a
plantation elite, and other post-Civil War realities. But the Court's
adoption of the Northern Democratic definition of slavery structured an
understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments devoid of such
protection.
Brandwein demonstrated the cloak of authority this interpretation has
worn over the years. The Warren Court's subsequent expansion of rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, she argued, could not draw on
Republican interpretations of the history of slavery because the Court had
already enshrined the Northern Democratic interpretation in judicial
opinion. This expansion was thus vulnerable to withering attacks that it
was the project of politics, rather than law. Brandwein powerfully reveals
how the Court's early understanding of slavery and the Reconstruction
Amendments became an "institutionally privileged" account influencing
subsequent legal decision-making.4 8
Parents Involved presents a useful lens for examining the contemporary
production of historical truth by the Supreme Court. Its collection of
opinions embodies no single authoritative interpretation of the legacy of
Brown and the history of race relations in America. Rather, they reveal a
lively "rhetorical contest" between multiple historical accounts. By
studying a moment in which the Court is engaged in "rhetorical contest,"
perhaps we may gain insight into how particular versions of our history
eventually become "prevailing legal orthodox[y]."49
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 61 (discussing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873)).
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id. at 3.
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II. PARENTS INVOLVED V. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
Parents Involved presented the question of whether local school boards
may voluntarily utilize race-conscious criteria in student assignment plans
as a means of promoting racially integrated schools. In a plurality
opinion, the Court struck down such plans in Seattle and Louisville on the
grounds that neither plan was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive
strict scrutiny. Chief Justice Roberts's opinion, representing the four-
Justice plurality, further suggested that voluntary integration did not
constitute a compelling interest. The opinion identified two interests that
qualify as compelling when evaluating the use of racial classifications in
the school context - (1) remedying past discrimination and (2) achieving
diversity in higher education - and concluded that neither was applicable
to the case.so
Justice Thomas, who joined the plurality's opinion in full, wrote a
separate concurrence rejecting virtually all voluntary attempts to achieve
racially integrated schools. He suggested that such efforts amounted to
"social engineer[ing]" and argued that the "Court does not sit to create a
society that includes all Americans or to solve the problems of troubled
inner city schooling."' Justice Thomas did note the "perceived negative
effects of racial imbalance" but rejected the notion that an "ultimate
remedy" for the problem was even attainable.5 2 Over time, he observed,
schools would naturally "fall in and out of balance" and that balance itself
would shift according to changing demographics.5 3
Justice Kennedy, who joined the Court's opinion but not the plurality's,
wrote a separate concurrence explicitly recognizing that a compelling
governmental interest did exist in "avoiding racial isolation" and
"achiev[ing] a diverse student population."54  Justice Breyer, who
50. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720-23 (2007)
(plurality opinion). While the opinion seems inclined to rule that voluntary integration does not
advance a compelling interest, thus completely prohibiting the use of race in student assignments, it
"only hint[s] in that direction." James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121
HARv. L. REv. 131, 131 (2007); see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726, 732-733 ("The parties and
their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact has a marked impact on test scores and
other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits. The debate is not one we need
to resolve, however, because it is clear that the racial classifications employed by the district are not
narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational social benefits asserted to flow from racial
diversity. ... While the school districts use various verbal formulations to describe the interest they
seek to promote - racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration - they offer no
definition of the interest that suggests it differs from racial balance. . . . However closely related race-
based assignments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself cannot be the goal, whether labeled
'racial diversity' or anything else.")




54. Id. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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authored the dissent, found that the student assignment plans were
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest." Justice
Stevens endorsed Justice Breyer's dissent in its entirety. However, he
prepared a separate dissent, in which he asserted that the plurality's
decision represented a radical break from precedent.56
Parents Involved invokes a struggle over the legacy of Brown. Justice
Roberts acknowledged this struggle, observing that "[t]he parties and their
amici debate which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown."" The
Court actively engaged this debate, but the opinions stake deeply
conflicting claims to the mantle of Brown. Justice Roberts declared
Brown to be a story about "schoolchildren [being] told where they could
and could not go to school based on the color of their skin," and Parents
Involved to be another chapter to that tale, refusing to "allow this once
again - even for very different reasons."58 Justice Thomas confirmed this
reading of Brown, citing Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson
and noting that this view "was the rallying cry for the lawyers who
litigated Brown."5 9 Justice Thomas further denied the dissent's
interpretive claim to Brown by likening its arguments to those put forth by
pro-segregationists during the Brown litigation.60
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer rejoined scathingly. Justice Stevens
remarked on the "cruel irony in the Chief Justice's reliance on our
decision in Brown" and accused Chief Justice Roberts of "rewrit[ing] the
history of one of this Court's most important decisions." 6' He concluded
his dissent with the searing declaration: "It is my firm conviction that no
Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with
today's decision. "62 Justice Breyer similarly invoked the word "cruel" in
his dissent, describing the plurality's opinion as a "cruel distortion of
history."6 The promise of Brown, Justice Breyer advanced, was "of true
racial equality . . . as a matter of everyday life in the Nation's cities and
55. Id. at 803-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 747 (plurality opinion).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in
Plessy: Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."'
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
60. Id. at 773-74 ("The dissent appears to pin its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to
current societal practice and expectations, deference to local officials, likely practical consequences,
and reliance on previous statements from this and other courts. Such a view was ascendant in this
Court's jurisprudence for several decades. It first appeared in Plessy . . . . The segregationists in
Brown embraced the arguments the Court endorsed in Plessy. Though Brown decisively rejected
those arguments, today's dissent replicates them to a distressing extent.").
61. Id. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 803.
63. Id. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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schools."' He concluded that "[t]o invalidate the plans under review is to
threaten the promise of Brown."65
A. Judicial Use of History as Evidence
The modem comparison drawn between judge and historian focuses on
the use of evidence. Despite his criticism of the Supreme Court's use of
history for political ends, Alfred Kelly observed a close relationship
between the methodology of judicial decision-making and historical
scholarship. 66 Kelly noted that judges apply law by examining "a stream
of judicial precedent," not unlike when a historian studies the primary
sources.6 1 When the "primary sources" prove lacking, courts often
"inquire into the circumstances surrounding earlier judicial expositions of
the law, . . . get[ting] still deeper into the writing of history. "68 Kelly
likened this type of inquiry to the "external documentary criticism"
historians engage in "as a means to an adequate and sophisticated
evaluation of the source in question." 69
If Parents Involved is a case about the meaning of Brown, how does the
Supreme Court use Brown itself not only as judicial precedent, but also as
a source of history? Such a consideration must begin with a recognition
that Brown is far from an ordinary Supreme Court opinion. The Court has
transformed a dull eleven-page opinion into a sublime statement of
constitutional principle. This transformation has elevated Brown to an
"exalted place in the constitutional canon," generating a respect akin to
that accorded constitutional text itself.70 In fact, Brown has largely
64. Id. at 867.
65. Id. at 868. Lest the words of the Court leave any doubt, public commentary on the decision
depicted the case as a bitter fight between conflicting interpretations of Brown. See Linda
Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race in Integration Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2007 ("With competing blocs of justices claiming the mantle of Brown v. Board of Education, a
bitterly divided Supreme Court declared Thursday that public school systems cannot seek to achieve
or maintain integration through measures that take explicit account of a student's race."); Adam
Liptak, The Same Words, but Diferent Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007 ("[Parents Involved] has
reignited a societal debate about the role of race in education that will almost certainly prompt
divisive lawsuits around the country. Indeed, the decision has invited a fundamental reassessment of
Brown itself, perhaps the most important Supreme Court decision of the 20th century. 'There is a
historic clash between two dramatically different visions not only of Brown,' said Laurence H. Tribe,
a law professor at Harvard, 'but also the meaning of the Constitution."')




70. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARv. L. REv. 963,
998 (1998) ("Brown is normatively canonical. One can no more criticize it than one can suggest that
Mozart is a wildly overrated composer of music for eighteenth-century dinner parties. One
establishes oneself as a cultured person by affirming Mozart's genius; one establishes oneself as a
properly acculturated lawyer by affirming Brown's correctness."); Mark A. Graber, The Price of
Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 942 (2008) (outlining a three-stage process that
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replaced the Fourteenth Amendment as the preferred historical foundation
for understanding modern equal protection cases.n
The analogy to constitutional text is apt given that Parents Involved
applied two methods of historical interpretation to Brown that are
normally reserved for historical interpretation of the Constitution.
Charles Miller distinguished these two methods as "intent theory" and
Brown underwent to attain celebrity - (1) "fight for survival"; (2) "fight for extension"; (3) celebrity -
and noting that celebrity results in the unfortunate consequence that Brown now stands for anything
and everything ("Americans agree that Brown is a landmark decision, agree that decision should be
broadly interpreted, but insist that the 1954 ruling provides precedential support for their particular
and divergent constitutional visions.")); Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind
Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 203, 214 (2008); Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized
Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 383, 388 (2000) (describing the requisite
elements for Brown's inclusion in the "upper canon" of constitutional law: "First, Brown is unlikely
ever to be overturned; second, no one will disagree with it; and third, the people most likely to
disagree with it -judicial conservatives such as Rehnquist - have endorsed it. The last factor, that an
opinion is devoid of principled legal or moral opposition, is the most important one for gaining
admission into the upper canon.").
71. Pamela S. Karlan, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1051-52 (2009) ("Brown occupies a peculiar position
within constitutional interpretation. . . . [Wihatever originalism means with respect to other
constitutional issues, when it comes to the Equal Protection Clause and its application to questions of
race-conscious government action, the Court seldom looks beyond Brown. Put simply, the Court has
abandoned 'Framers' originalism' in favor of 'Brown originalism,' in which Justices claim fidelity,
not to what the Equal Protection Clause meant in 1868, but rather what the Supreme Court meant in
1954."); Schmidt, supra note 69, at 206. The Supreme Court's own investigation into the historical
record of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown may illuminate modern reliance on Brown in
adjudicating equal protection cases. Alexander Bickel, who was serving as a law clerk for Justice
Felix Frankfurter when the Court took the segregation cases, was assigned by Justice Frankfurter "to
read through the Congressional Globe and the equivalent records, wherever extant, of the state
legislatures during the immediate post-Civil War years to determine if there was anything in the
history of the legislative debates over the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment that foreclosed the
Court from now striking down segregation." KLUGER, supra note 36, at 602. Bickel's project
"precisely presaged the research that would be carried on by the litigants" in answers to questions
later posed by the Court. Id. at 656. Bickel's conclusion, embodied in a memorandum that Justice
Frankfurter distributed to the other justices on the Court, "held that the legislative history, while
revealing no evidence that the framers of the amendment had intended to prohibit school segregation,
did not foreclose future generations from acting on the question, either by congressional statute or by
judicial review." Id. at 658. In 1955, Bickel reviewed this historical project with reference to Chief
Justice Warren's declaration in Brown that after "exhaustive[] consideration" of "the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868," the sources proved "inconclusive."
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1955). Bickel explained that despite extensive
historical briefing, the "brevity of the [Court's] reference to the history of the fourteenth amendment's
adoption" was a reflection of the necessity "to exert to the utmost the prestige, the oracular authority
of the institution." Id., at 2. For the Court to "speak unanimously, with one voice from the deep," it
chose to say less, for "the less said, the less chance of internal disagreement." Brown was a decision
"which, like a poem, 'should not mean / But be,' and . . . the Court saw this and acted on it." Id.
Thus, Brown itself eschewed an approach grounded in an interpretation of the past, declaring: "In
approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted,
or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light
of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way
can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws." Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93. Brown sharpens the distinction between judges and
historians, for the force of the opinion illustrates that when historical evidence appears (or is declared)
inconclusive, historians may opt for silence, but judges remain bound to issue a ruling that carries the
same weight as one backed by historical research.
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"ongoing history."7 2  Intent theory uses history to clarify the meaning of
the Constitution as originally drafted and ratified. It construes the
Constitution in accordance with the intentions of those who wrote it."
Ongoing history, on the other hand, uses history to reveal conditions in
the United States since ratification, which the Court believes have bearing
on current interpretation of the Constitution. 4 It venerates and applies
lessons derived from experience. Whereas intent theory says "this is what
was expected," ongoing history says "this is what the nation has
become."75
One way to understand the divergent interpretations of Brown in
Parents Involved is to recognize the use of these two methods of historical
interpretation by the Justices. Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion
and Justice Thomas's concurring opinion drew on intent theory to arrive
at their respective historical interpretations of Brown and its significance
for race relations in America. Importantly, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas utilized source materials behind Brown, invoking the
"history of the litigation that culminated in Brown," to interpret the intent
of the decision when it was handed down and defend their reading as
consonant with that intent. Their turn to these sources bears
resemblance to the traditional application of intent theory to the
Constitution, which looks primarily to the Philadelphia Convention of
1787 and the writing of the Founding Fathers to discern what the
72. MILLER, supra note 23, at 25-26.
73. Id. at 26. A few words about the distinction between "intent theory" and "originalism" are in
order. Confusion is apt to occur given that "originalism" is sometimes referred to as "original intent"
or "original intention." See INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT
3-4 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (describing originalism as both a "a doctrine of original intent" and a
"jurisprudence of original intention"). The history of originalism is long and complex, but this brief
discussion will focus primarily on the modem originalism movement, which emerged in the 1970s
and 1980s in response to the perceived activism of the Warren Court. Richards, supra note 23, at
823-24. First, Charles Miller's work was published in 1969, just prior to the emergence of modem
originalism as a consistent theory of constitutional interpretation. Therefore, Miller's articulation of
"intent theory" was not explicitly associated with a prevailing legal ideology (although he did note
that "the history concerned with the formation and ratification of the Constitution serves to restrain
the Court in its decisions."). MILLER, supra note 23, at 25. Second, modem originalists themselves
distinguish the two concepts of "original understanding" and "original intent," the latter of which
more accurately corresponds to Miller's "intent theory." BRANDWEIN, supra note 17, at 17.
According to modem originalists, original understanding "refers to what the words of a provision
could reasonably be taken to mean" and is thus "a more objective assessment of that provision." Id.
Original intent, on the other hand, "refers to what legislators wanted to accomplish with a particular
provision, or what legislators thought the language of the provision meant" and is a more "subjective
assessment of a provision's meaning." Id. Some originalists associate "originalism" with "original
intent" (e.g., Raoul Berger) and others associate "originalism" with "original meaning" (e.g., Justice
Antonin Scalia). Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
909, 915-18 (1998). Thus, "intent theory" might very well be a component to some variants of
modem originalism.
74. MILLER, supra note 23, at 25.
75. Id. at 26.
76. Schmidt, supra note 69, at 204.
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Constitution was intended to mean.
Chief Justice Roberts drew on the briefs and oral arguments of the
NAACP lawyers in Brown to articulate an anti-classification
interpretation of Brown. The anti-classification principle holds that equal
protection invalidates all distinctions - malicious or benign - based on
race.78  Proclaiming that this reading is "more faithful to the heritage of
Brown," Chief Justice Roberts quoted directly from a brief submitted by
the NAACP lawyers: "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from
according differential treatment to American children on the basis of their
color or race." 79  The Chief Justice buttressed this citation with a direct
quotation from NAACP lawyer Robert Carter's oral arguments before the
Supreme Court: "We have one fundamental contention which we will
seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that
no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording education
opportunities among its citizens."so Chief Justice Roberts concluded by
declaring that it was Carter's "position that prevailed in this Court, which
emphasized in its remedial opinion [Brown II] that what was '[a]t stake is
the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as
soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis,' and what was required
was 'determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis."'
Justice Thomas similarly drew upon the briefs and oral arguments of
the NAACP lawyers in Brown to support his anti-classification
interpretation, noting that this "view was the rallying cry for the lawyers
77. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 26, 190.
78. Schmidt, supra note 69, at 204. The anti-classification principle, as well as its counterpart,
the anti-subordination principle, were two distinct yet undistinguished formulations of the Equal
Protection Clause contained in Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: "In view of the
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens." 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Where the anti-
classification claim advances that "the Constitution is colorblind and prohibits racial classification",
the anti-subordination claim insists that "the Constitution is opposed to the maintenance of racial
caste, group subordination, or second-class citizenship." Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 6, at 11. Owen Fiss identified these two
principles in his foundational piece, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107 (1976). When Justice Harlan wrote his dissent in Plessy, "these two versions of the
antidiscrimination principle - anti-subordination versus anti-classification, or equal citizenship versus
color-blindness - did not strongly conflict." Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 6, at 11. However, "the promises and failures of black
advancement in the second half of the twentieth century have brought the differences between the ...
approaches into starker contrast." Id. at 12. Parents Involved is so pivotal because it marks "the first
time that the Court returned to the issue in Brown - the assignment of children to public schools - in
the context of contemporary colorblind constitutionalism." Karlan, supra 70, at 1062.
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who litigated Brown."82  From the brief submitted by the NAACP
lawyers, Justice Thomas plucked the lines, "[t]hat the Constitution is
color blind is our dedicated belief," and "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
precludes a state from imposing distinctions or classifications based upon
race and color alone."" Justice Thomas also utilized the same statement
from NAACP lawyer Robert Carter's oral arguments that Justice Roberts
quoted in his opinion. Finally, Justice Thomas introduced direct
quotations from the briefs and oral arguments presented by the NAACP
lawyers in the companion cases to Brown, which asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment categorically prohibits the government from
engaging in racial classification. 84
Brown has long been recognized as "particularly the product of legal
advocacy. "8 By relying on the arguments of the NAACP legal team,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas advance that the NAACP's
legal claims in Brown are a vital source for interpreting the meaning of
the case. Indeed, given the sparse language of Brown itself, the Justices'
turn to these sources is hardly surprising. At the same time, the use of
these sources triggers important questions about the judicial use of
historical materials more broadly. If Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas chose to parse the arguments of the NAACP lawyers, why did
they not consult materials depicting the Brown Court's internal decision-
making process and other briefs submitted to the Court?"
Christopher Schmidt has noted that amicus briefs submitted by the
Justice Department in support of desegregation, for example, were
particularly influential with the Court." While the Justice Department
also presented a strong case for an anti-classification reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it integrated this argument with an anti-
subordination claim. The Justice Department's briefs discussed
"colorblind constitution in the context of an analysis that highlighted the
82. Id. at 772 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Thurgood Marshall's
Image of the Blue-Eyed Child in Brown, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 226, 230, 235 (1993) (describing
Thurgood Marshall's decision to present an anti-classification argument as a "stroke of tactical
genius" that brought "racial discrimination into the case as a vice that the Justices themselves must
either practice or put aside" and necessarily "spur[red] them to action").
83. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 772.
84. Id. at 773 n.20 ("[W]e take the unqualified position that the Fourteenth Amendment has
totally stripped the state of power to make race and color the basis for governmental action." Juris.
Statement in Davis v. County Sch. Bd.; "[Tihe state is deprived of any power to make any racial
classifications in any governmental field." Tr. of Oral Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott).
85. Schmidt, supra note 69, at 215,
86. See id. at 207-08, 216-33 (examining these historical materials and concluding that (a)
"isolating the NAACP lawyers' anticlassification argument as their only, or even primary,
constitutional claim in the school segregation cases fails to do justice to the historical record"; and (b)
the Justices on the Brown Court consciously chose not to ground their decision on the anti-
classification principle).
87. Schmidt, supra note 69, at 229.
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specific harms of racial segregation and the necessity of integrated
education."" While the NAACP lawyers had certainly formulated a
particular understanding of Brown, their voice alone could hardly serve as
the only "contemporaneous commentary."89
Although the dissenting opinions in Parents Involved decried the
historical interpretation of Brown articulated by the plurality, they did not
meaningfully engage the sources utilized by Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas.90 Rather, Justice Breyer's dissent provided an ongoing history
account of Brown, focusing "on the experience with school desegregation
following the Brown decisions - not the preceding litigation history." 9 1
This difference in methodological approach informs the sources utilized
by Justice Breyer in supporting his historical interpretation of Brown.
These sources fall primarily into two categories: Supreme Court opinions
descended from Brown and social science data, both of which serve to
provide a contextualized history of segregation in America following the
Brown decision.92
Justice Breyer's dissent reflected on the history of the Court's
desegregation cases subsequent to Brown, as a means of demonstrating
his commitment to judicial precedent as well as illustrating the social
context in which these cases were decided. Charles Miller described one
type of ongoing history as "an historical essay that traces a constitutional
issue over a span of years."93 History is thus viewed as "process rather
than event," and law is accordingly regarded "in terms of evolution and
development rather than immanent meaning." 94 Justice Breyer's review
of the Supreme Court's desegregation cases takes the form of an historical
essay, considering the Court's post-Brown jurisprudence as a reflection of
changing circumstances on the ground.
88. Id. at 229-30.
89. MILLER, supra note 23, at 190. In fact, the accuracy of Chief Justice Roberts' and Justice
Thomas' depiction of the NAACP position has been challenged by surviving members of the legal
team following the Parents Involved decision. Robert Carter, the NAACP lawyer quoted by both
justices in their respective opinions, stated in response to the decision: "All that race was used for at
that point in time was to deny equal opportunity to black people. It's to stand that argument on its
head to use race the way they use it now." Jack Greenberg, another lawyer for the plaintiffs in Brown,
described Chief Justice Robert's interpretation as "preposterous" and stated: "The plaintiffs in Brown
were concerned with the marginalization and subjugation of black people. They said you can't
consider race, but that's how race was being used." Liptak, supra note 64.
90. The discussion of the dissenting opinions will focus exclusively on Justice Breyer's opinion.
In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens noted that he "join[s] Justice Breyer's eloquent and
unanswerable dissent in its entirety." Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His
brief four-page opinion served to emphasize his belief that the Court's judgment was a radical break
from several decades of clear judicial precedent.
91. Schmidt, supra note 69, at 208 (emphasis added).
92. See id. at 212-13.
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Defending the use of race-conscious criteria by local school boards to
achieve integration, Justice Breyer noted that "dozens of" post-Brown
cases saw the Court requiring school boards to utilize "race-conscious
practices, such as mandatory busing and race-based restrictions on
voluntary transfers" in order to "comply with Brown's constitutional
holding."9 5 Furthermore, Justice Breyer observed that, in these cases,
"the Court left much of the determination of how to achieve integration to
the judgment of local communities."9 He supported this observation by
quoting the same passage twice from the 1971 case Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board ofEducation97 :
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well
conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a
whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities.9 8
Justice Breyer employed the word "context" repeatedly in explaining
the reasoning behind Supreme Court cases granting local school boards
discretion to employ race-conscious criteria in pursuit of integration. He
emphasized the need for contextual sensitivity in distinguishing types of
racial classification. He disputed Chief Justice Roberts's historical
rendering of segregation, noting pointedly that "segregation policies did
not simply tell schoolchildren 'where they could and could not go to
school based on the color of their skin.""' Rather, Justice Breyer
advanced an anti-subordination claim, arguing that segregation
"perpetuated a caste system rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80
years of legalized subordination.""oo Justice Breyer observed that "from
Swann to Grutter, this Court's decisions have emphasized this
distinction," recognizing the social context underpinning segregation.' 0
He concluded that "[t]he lesson of history is not that efforts to continue
racial segregation are constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to
achieve racial integration."l 02
Justice Breyer further noted the importance of context in
95. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
98. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 804-05, 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at
16).
99. Id. at 867 (citing id. at 747 (plurality opinion)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 864.
102. Id. at 867 (emphasis added).
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"acknowledging that local school boards better understand their own
communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best
meet the educational needs of their pupils."' 0 3 Perhaps referencing the
Court's own mixed record in implementing desegregation, Justice Breyer
observed that "judges are not well suited to act as school
administrators."'" He drove this point home by providing another
ongoing history, a richly detailed record of desegregation efforts in the
Seattle and Louisville school districts over the past five decades.'0 The
histories of these school districts, Justice Breyer observed, are "typical
school integration stories" that help make sense of the Court's past
decisions to delegate authority to local school districts on matters of racial
integration.' These histories highlight the "complexity of . .. tasks and
the practical difficulties that local school boards face when they seek to
achieve greater racial integration."1 07 Justice Breyer noted that such
facts and circumstances help explain why in [the school
desegregation] context, the law often leaves legislatures, city
councils, school boards, and voters with a broad range of choice,
thereby giving different communities the opportunity to try different
solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove
most successful or seem to them best to suit their individual needs."'
By integrating the history of Supreme Court precedent with that of the
Seattle and Louisville school districts, Justice Breyer engaged in a multi-
layered exercise of ongoing history, describing the interplay between
evolving legal judgment and social experience.
Justice Breyer's copious citation of social statistics to illustrate the
experience of school desegregation post-Brown further reveals his use of
the methodology of ongoing history. Charles Miller observed that since
"the evidence of ongoing history merges into contemporary observation at
no clearly definable date," it "eventually yields to the use of social
evidence as a principle of adjudication.""9 Early in his dissent, Justice
Breyer noted demographic trends that augured "a return to school systems
103. Id. at 849.
104. Id. at 848-49. In the immediate decade following the Brown decision, school desegregation
"proceeded at a snail's pace in southern school districts." School boards and state officials "engaged
in dilatory and evasive maneuvers aimed at nullifying Brown's command." Elaine R. Jones,
Foreword to ORFIELD, EATON & THE HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 13, at ix; Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OFEDUCATON SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 6, at 5.
105. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 807-819.
106. Id. at 806.
107. Id. at 822.
108. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
109. MILLER, supra note 23, at 25-26.
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that are in fact (though not in law) resegregated."" 0 Justice Breyer
utilized this historical trend as a way to understand the school assignment
plans in Seattle and Louisville, which operated "for the sake of
eradicating earlier school segregation, bringing about integration, or
preventing retrogression.""' In contrast to this bleak demographic data,
Justice Breyer introduced social studies that suggested positive
"educational benefits" and "civic effects" of integrated schooling.'12
Justice Breyer refused to "claim to know how best to stop harmful
discrimination; how best to create a society that includes all Americans;
how best to overcome our serious problems of increasing de facto
segregation, troubled inner city schooling, and poverty correlated with
race."" 3 Nevertheless, his dissent gave voice to these social trends and
argued the need to consider Seattle and Louisville's student assignment
plans with reference to these social realities.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of Justice Breyer's use of ongoing
history to interpret the significance of Brown is his identification of
Brown with a promise. For the dissent, the significance of Brown was not
to be found in evidence contemporaneous with the case, but in the present
circumstances of America. Brown, Justice Breyer concluded, "held out a
promise," a "promise of true racial equality - not as a matter of fine words
on paper, but as a matter of everyday ife in the Nation's cities and
schools."" 4 For the dissent, Brown was significant for articulating an
ideal against which to measure "how we actually live" in post-Brown
America.'s
B. Judicial Use of History as Narrative
This section shifts from an analysis of the judicial use of history as
evidence to the judicial use of history as narrative by examining Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion. The primary reason for this shift is that
Justice Kennedy did not articulate another interpretation of Brown. In
fact, he hardly engaged in the meaning of Brown at all." 6 Instead, Justice
Kennedy drew on history in the form of a particular narrative about public
education in America. Thus, his opinion was largely at odds with those
focusing on historical interpretations of Brown.
110. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 839-41.
113. Id. at 862.
114. Id. at 867 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. Schmidt, supra note 69, at 212 n.48 ("Justice Kennedy's concurrence touched on Brown
only lightly and showed none of the interest in its background history that is evidenced in the opinions
of the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas.").
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The earliest association between judge and historian focused on the
shared importance of storytelling. Traditional historiographers, extending
back to the time of Herodotus, have long observed that history consists of
"categories of lived stories, individual and collective.""' The job of the
historian is "to uncover these stories and to retell them in a narrative."'1 8
History translates as narrative for several reasons. First, historians
construct an account after gathering the relevant facts, and are therefore
inclined to relay that account chronologically "like a storyteller . . .
attempt[ing] to follow that order in his exposition, rather than jumping
backwards and forwards in time."119 Second, historians are often
consciously appealing to a particular audience, to which like a storyteller,
he may also wish to offer moral lessons. Third, history, like any story, is
teleologically driven; historians either know or infer a particular outcome
and "only those events which are considered by him to be relevant to that
outcome will find a place in his work."' 20 Finally, historians often
emphasize human action or choice, similar to "paradigm cases of what
constitute 'stories,"' which "stress[] the changes in fortune which follow
upon these choices."'21
Legal decision as narrative makes sense for the same reasons. Facts are
recounted in chronological fashion. The decision tells a story to an
audience and often includes lessons in law, policy, and ethics. Judges
emphasize those facts and legal arguments most favorable to their
conclusion. Finally, cases and their outcomes emerge from a particular
set of conscious human action, whether it be a breach of contract,
violence against another, or protest against state action.
At the same time, in both history and law, critiques of narrative
discourse have debunked the notion of storytelling as objective
account. 122 Many "modern historians hold that narrative discourse, far
from being a neutral medium for the representation of historical events
and processes, is the very stuff of a mythical view of reality." 23
Similarly in the law, some argue that "[t]he resolution of any individual
case ... relies heavily on a court's adoption of a particular story," albeit
"one that makes sense, is true to what the listeners know about the world,
117. HAYDEN V. WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL
REPRESENTATION ix-x (1987).
118. Id.
119. Maurice Mandelbaum, A Note on History as Narrative, 6 HIST. & THEORY 413, 414 (1967)
(criticizing the narrative construct of history, but outlining reasons for the appeal of history as
narrative).
120. Id. at 415.
121. Id.
122. Compare with the postmodemist challenges to the objectivity of evidence and proof. Supra
note 33 and accompanying text.
123. WHITE, supra note 116, at ix.
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and hangs together."' 2 4 Therefore, to the extent that legal judgment is
structured as historical narrative, we should construe that narrative as but
an "official" or "institutional" account that has managed to trump
others.125
Understanding Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved as
historical narrative holds particular resonance because of his position as
the swing Justice in the case. Technically speaking, Justice Kennedy's
opinion is nothing but dictum. But if one approaches the opinion from a
Holmesian law-as-prediction perspective, Kennedy's opinion is
controlling. 26 School districts pursuing the goal of racial integration are
likely focused on Justice Kennedy's opinion to guide their policies
moving forward. In that sense, Kennedy's narrative, while unique among
the opinions, may eventually become the "institutionally privileged"
account of Brown's legacy in America. Examining this narrative provides
further perspective on the process through which "particular versions of
events beat out their competition and gain truth status." 27
In a comment assessing Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents
Involved, Heather Gerken eloquently posited that Justice Kennedy's
opinion is structured around a "constitutional stor[y]" about schools, not
about race. 2 8 This story is one that Justice Kennedy "has long associated
with the educational domain - the exceptional role that public schools
play in inculcating civic morality."l 29 By using the narrative construct of
124. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, supra note 21, at 2080 (emphasis added).
125. BRANDWEIN, supra note 17, at 3; Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized
Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 123, 163-64 (1992)
("In courts of law, judges and juries cannot do what a correspondence theory of language would have
them do; they cannot hold up testimony against events in the world to see which versions 'match'
better. . . . The whole idea of matching descriptions against the world is misleading because, apart
from being metaphorical, it assumes that there is only one perspective, only one point of view, only
one ideology, no room for multiple meanings, and no potential for disagreement. In short, it assumes
no problem with understanding how accounts as socially situated cultural products relate to evidence
of the world. But particular 'true' stories and particular descriptive statements are often selected from
among a set of arguably accurate versions of reality. .. . The vexing question is . . . how it is that
some particular description instead of some other description comes to be forwarded as the
authoritative version of events. This raises questions of power and ideology, of the 'situatedness' of
the descriptions that pass for truth, and of the social agendas they support.").
126. See Ryan, supra 49, at 137 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897)) ("This is because the four dissenters would uphold the Seattle and
[Louisville] plans and would apply looser criteria to assess voluntary integration plans than would
Justice Kennedy. A fortiori, they would uphold any plan that Justice Kennedy would approve. There
are thus five votes for upholding some uses of race to achieve integration, but the only vote that really
counts is Justice Kennedy's. . . . Separating holdings from dicta is an exercise conducted most often
by courts looking to distinguish prior cases rather than follow them; in the real world, most people
count to five.").
127. BRANDWEIN, supra note 17, at 3.
128. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 104,108 (2007).
129. Id. at 106. Gerken credits Robert Post for the term "domain" although she notes that the
domain of education bears more likeness to Michael Walzer's "spheres," as it is "tied to a sense of
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schools, rather than race, Justice Kennedy transformed Parents Involved
into a "story about what students learn in school, not whether they have
an equal opportunity to do so." 3 0  By way of contrast, Chief Justice
Roberts employed the structure of historical narrative to tell a story about
the anti-classification, and thus anti-racial balancing, argument of the
NAACP lawyers in Brown. And Justice Breyer tells a story about the
racial integration efforts of school districts across the nation in the wake
of Brown. Both stories invoke interpretations about the history of race
relations in America and ask what proper role the Supreme Court should
play in this history.
Justice Kennedy framed his opinion in a dramatically different fashion.
His opinion begins by championing the role that schools play in imparting
civic morality to students and relating that role to racial integration
policies. The first lines of the opinion read: "The Nation's schools strive
to teach that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds,
and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all. In these cases
two school districts . . . seek to teach that principle by having classrooms
that reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding community." BTown
was not mentioned in these opening sentences; the "core narrative" is
"less about equal educational opportunity, the dominant note in any equal
protection story," than about the prevailing virtues of diversity in the civic
education of our nation's children.13 2
By presenting a narrative about public education, Justice Kennedy
utilized aspects of the ongoing history methodology. Like the dissent,
Justice Kennedy measured current social realities against past ideals
articulated by the Court. The opening of his opinion acknowledged the
present concerns of the Seattle and Louisville school districts: "That the
school districts consider these plans to be necessary should remind us our
highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled."1 33 Justice Kennedy later criticized
the plurality's anti-classification approach as one that failed to "recognize
and confront the flaws and injustices that remain." 34 He observed that
while the "enduring hope is that race should not matter the reality is that
too often it does." 1s Justice Kennedy concluded that while Justice
Harlan's appeal to a "color-blind" Constitution "must command our
assent," the truth is that "it cannot be a universal constitutional
place as well as a particular form of social ordering." Id. at 106 n.12.
130. Id.
131. Parents Involved in Crnty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. Gerken, supra note 127, at 115.
133. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).








Where the dissent and Justice Kennedy part ways is in defining
unfulfilled aspirations. For the dissent, those aspirations are firmly
grounded in Brown and the promise of true racial equality. School
desegregation is only one element in that story, albeit a critical one:
For much of this Nation's history, the races remained divided. It was
not long ago that people of different races drank from separate
fountains, rode on separate buses, and studied in separate schools. In
this Court's finest hour, Brown v. Board ofEducation challenged this
history and helped to change it. . . . [Brown] sought one law, one
Nation, one people, not simply as a matter of legal principle but in
terms of how we actually live.' 37
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, viewed Parents Involved through
the prism of educational progress. This narrative shifts the focus away
from racial equality per se, towards racial equality as a proxy for fostering
diverse, and thus, positive educational environments. While Justice
Kennedy concluded his opinion by declaring that "[t]his Nation has a
moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating
an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all its children,"
his understanding of equal opportunity was not informed by race.'
Rather, in the context of schools, equal opportunity is about "achiev[ing]
a diverse student population" to foster civic morality; race is but "one
component of that diversity."' 39 According to Justice Kennedy, our
unfulfilled aspirations are borne out in the "important work" of schools,
which seek to "bring[] together students of different racial, ethnic, and
economic backgrounds." 4 0
The different narrative structures employed by Justice Breyer and
Justice Kennedy explain their divergent readings of Court precedent
despite their common use of the ongoing history methodology. Take, for
example, their interpretations of Grutter v. Bollinger,141 a case in which
the Court affirmed the University of Michigan Law School's use of race-
conscious criteria in admissions decisions. Justice Breyer's dissent cited
Grutter repeatedly, most notably for the proposition that "[c]ontext
matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal
Protection Clause." 42 Justice Breyer's understanding of Grutter flowed
136. Id. at 788.
137. Id. at 867-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 798.
140. Id.
141. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
142. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326).
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from his anti-subordination narrative of race; "[t]he context [in Parents
Involved] is one of racial limits that seek, not to keep the races apart, but
to bring them together."l 43 Justice Kennedy disputed Justice Breyer's
reading of Grutter, contending that Grutter cannot even be considered a
case wholly about race.'" Not surprisingly, Justice Kennedy chose to
focus instead on the value of diversity in higher education. Grutter,
Justice Kennedy asserted, withstood strict scrutiny because it considered
race to be only one factor of many "pertinent elements of diversity."' 4 5
Comparing Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy's use of the ongoing
history methodology suggests how the judicial use of narrative can
inherently structure the judicial use of evidence. Although both opinions
measure social realities against articulated ideals, the choice of narrative
results in different readings of the same materials. Choice of narrative
might even influence the universe of sources consulted by the Justices.
For example, if we imagine Justice Kennedy's narrative becoming the
dominant framework for considering future equal protection cases in the
context of schools, the sources consulted by the Court might shift
accordingly. Perhaps Brown will remain the canonical text for such cases,
but justices engaging in a methodology of original intent might mine
contemporaneous records for evidence regarding Brown's intended effect
on the nature of civic education. And justices engaging in a methodology
of ongoing history might consider Brown's subsequent effect on
education itself, such as the modem curriculum of schools.
Justice Kennedy's account of Parents Involved shifts his attention away
from a narrative informed by race and focuses on a narrative structured
around public education in America.146 While Justice Kennedy "has long
thought of schools as institutions for teaching students to be citizens," he
now "sees that those lessons extend to interracial relations."1 47  Drawing
this connection produces a visual gestalt.148 School desegregation is no
longer presented as a struggle over racial equality, but becomes a story
143. Id. at 835.
144. Id. at 792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Gratz involved a system where race was not the
entire classification. The procedures in Gratz placed much less reliance on race than do the plans at
issue here.... The same must be said for the controlling opinion in Grutter.").
145. Id. at 793.
146. Gerken, supra note 127, at 107.
147. Id. at 119.
148. The concept of "visual gestalt" comes from Thomas Kuhn's study on the structure of
scientific revolutions. Kuhn argued that scientific revolutions occurred through paradigm shifts,
which sometimes entailed little more than "handling the same bundle of data as before, but placing
them in a new system of relations with one another by giving them a different framework." This
reorientation is like a visual gestalt: "the marks on paper that were first seen as a bird are now seen as
an antelope." THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF ScIENTFIc REVOLUTIONS 85 (3d ed., 1996).
Similarly, Justice Kennedy "handles" much of the same evidence - e.g., fact pattern, judicial
precedent - as the other members of the Court, but "by giving them a different framework," comes
away with a remarkably different story about the meaning of Parents Involved.
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about how best we educate our nation's children.
III. CONCLUSION
This paper considered the judge as historian by examining the Supreme
Court's treatment of Brown as historical event in Parents Involved. In a
collection of opinions, the Court revealed its use of several different
historical methodologies to arrive at divergent interpretations about the
legacy of Brown and the history of race relations (and public education) in
America. The plurality focused on an intent-based history of Brown,
evaluating the briefs and oral arguments of the NAACP lawyers to argue
for an anti-classification reading of Brown. The dissent studied the
ongoing history of Brown, considering the interaction between a line of
judicial precedents extending from Brown and evolving social
circumstances to champion an anti-subordination interpretation of Brown.
And Justice Kennedy, the swing justice, eschewed a historical narrative of
Brown structured around race, opting instead to tell a "constitutional
story" about public education in America.
If this interpretive splintering makes us uneasy, it is because Brown is
held to represent America's "national narrative."l 49 Michael Klarman's
reinterpretation of Brown's relationship to the transformation of race
relations in America so offended members of the legal academy because
he challenged that narrative. But unlike academic scholarship, the public
authority vested in the Court endows its historical accounts with the force
of legal judgment. For all the similarities the judge bears to historian, the
official weight accorded judicial decisions provides the meaningful
difference.
Parents Involved may be welcome because it reveals competing
conceptions of Brown as historical event. Interpretive splintering may
make us uneasy, but it opens up the Court's various uses and
interpretations of history to critical inquiry. By critical inquiry, we learn
not to dutifully accept the Court's rendering of history, whether it be
embodied in an unanimous or plurality opinion. We may also have to
teach ourselves to come to terms with a more open or plural
understanding of Brown. Brown, like the Constitution, is a sacred public
text; time is unlikely to settle battles over its interpretation.
But perhaps a particular history of Brown, such as Justice Kennedy's
narrative about the values of civic education and the progress we have
made in this arena, will eventually ascend to "institutionally privileged"
status. Then Parents Involved itself may one day serve as an historical
source. The other opinions would remind us of alternative accounts of
149. Balkin, Brown as kon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID,
supra note 6, at 5.
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Brown, particularly as a story about race relations in America, albeit with
conflicting versions. By exposing a moment in which the Court was
engaged in a battle over historical truth, Parents Involved helps us
understand the process by which the Court constructs an official account
of both history and law.
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